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The problems as to the recognition to be accorded the relative rights of security
holders in pending railroad bankruptcies are the most complex that have arisen since
the decision in the Boyd case' focused attention on this phase of reorganization law.
This is due not merely to the number of railroads involved,2 but to the intensity of
their financial difficulties.
The typical railroad reorganization of the x914-i93o period was, by present stand-
ards, not severe. Usually it was carried out through foreclosure of a junior mortgage
constituting a general lien upon the bulk of the property of the carrier. Underlying
liens, whether divisional or system in character, were commonly left undisturbed.
The necessary reduction in fixed charges was accomplished through the exchange of
the bonds secured by the mortgage under foreclosure, partly or wholly, for other
types of securities-income bonds or preferred or common stock. Then, as now, it
was usually necessary to raise funds for rehabilitation of the property and reor-
ganization expenses. Funds were also required for the payment of dissenters. Since
underlying liens were normally not foreclosed, it was impracticable to raise these
funds by the sale of bonds secured by a first mortgage. New money was obtained by
offering to stockholders, on payment of an "assessment," certain of the same rank of
securities as went to satisfy creditors' claims, as well as stock in the reorganized com-
pany. In order to give stockholders an inducement to pay the "assessment," this was
fixed at a figure somewhat less than the estimated market value of the entire package
of new securities offered. Under these circumstances, the Boyd doctrine required that
a "fair offer" of participation should also be made to all creditors. Hence, the re-
organization plan offered something to every class of security holders, although, in
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2 On July 31, 1939, xo8 railroads operating 76,703 miles of road, or 30.70% of the entire railroad
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the case of stockholders, and occasionally in that of unsecured creditors, continued
participation in the enterprise was dependent on supplying new moneys
The central legal question in these reorganizations was the extent to which this
right to retain a stake in the enterprise might properly be accorded to stockholders.4
Decisions as to the relative rights of creditors were few and far between.5 Indeed, a
Circuit Court of Appeals had held that this was not a subject with which equity
was concerned.6
In the past decade, the decreased earnings of the railroads, not merely in dollar
amount but in relation to their gross revenues, and the consequent sensitivity of net
railway operating income to declines in traffic or in rates or to increases in expenses,
have compelled reorganizations cutting much more deeply into capital structures.7
This has often required partial or total elimination of the fixed charge on senior
bonds.8 The general impairment of railroad credit has made it impracticable to raise
new money except by the sale of senior securities ranking ahead of, or, at least, along
with the best bonds issued in the reorganization. The destruction of the interest of
the stockholders, both economically and market-wise, has removed them, in most
cases, as potential sources of new moiney, and frequently the Reconstruction Finance
Corporation has been looked on to provide these funds.
This change in the economic situation has been paralleled, at least so far as con-
cerns the proceedings conducted under Section 77 of the Bankruptcy Act, by an
increase in the responsibility of the courts and the Commission for safeguarding the
relative rights of security holders. In the past, equity courts had been invited to
a Reorganizations to which the foregoing description would generally apply are the Wabash reor-
ganization of 1915, the Missouri Pacific and Chicago, Rock Island and Pacific reorganizations of x917,
and the Milwaukee reorganization of 1927. On the other hand, the Pere Marquette and the St. Louis
and San Francisco Railroad reorganizations of x916 reached down to substantially all of the underlying
and divisional liens.
' The leading cases were Louisville Trust Co. v. Louisville, N. A. & C. Ry., 174 U. S. 674 (1899);
Northern Pacific Ry. v. Boyd, 228 U. S. 482 (1913); Guaranty Trust Co. v. Missouri Pac. Ry., 238 Fed.
812 (E. D. Mo. 1916); North American Co. v. St. Louis & S. F. Ry., 246 Fed. 26o (E. D. Mo. 19z6);
Kansas City Ry. Co. v. Central Union Trust Co., 271 U. S. 445 (s926); Jameson v. Guaranty Trust Co.,
2o F. (2d) 8o8 (C. C. A. 7th, 1927), cert. denied, 275 U. S. 569 (1927).
' Guaranty Trust Co. v. Missouri Pac. Ry. Co.; Jameson v. Guaranty Tnist Co., both supra note 4.
'New York Trust Co. v. Continental & Commercial etc. Bank, 26 F. (2d) 872 (C. C. A. 8th, 19a8),
cen. denied, 278 U. S. 644 (1928).
' The ratio of net railway operating income to gross operating revenues of all Class I railroads fell
from 32.4% in i9oo and 30.4% in 1905 to 1o.4% in 1932, 16.5% in 1936, and 74.2% in 1937. Fifteen
Percent Case, 1937.1938, 226 1. C. C. 4, 59 (1938). Exhibit 4 in this case, prepared by Mr. Fairrnan
I. Dick of New York City, showed, at page 23, that 7 major roads in receivership in the 189o's had a
spread of 31.7% between gross revenues and expenses (including rents and taxes) and were reorganized
with fixed charges equal to 22.8% of revenues, whereas 20 roads in receivership or bankruptcy in the
fiscal year ended June 3o, 1937, had a spread of only 9.6% between gross revenues and expenses, as
compared with pre-receivership fixed charges of 7.9% of revenues. In other words, the pre-receivership
fixed charges of the roads now undergoing reorganization took considerably less of the shipper's dollar
than the post-receivership fixed charges of the x89o's, but the spread between revenues and expenses was
only a third of that in the earlier pedod.
'Examples are the Milwaukee General Mortgage 4% bonds and the Western Pacific F'rsr-Mortgage
5% bonds of 1946. Chicago, M., St. P. & P. R. R. Reorg., Fin. Doe. No. 1o882 (Feb. 12, 1940),
mimeo. rep. at 133-135, mod. (June 4, 1940); Western Pac. R. R. Reorg., 230 I. C. C. 61, 64, 101 (1938),
233 1. C. C. 409, 417 (1939).
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scrutinize the fairness of plans primarily in an endeavor to secure immunity from
the Boyd doctrine by obtaining a judicial pronouncement that a "fair offer" had been
made to junior creditors.9 The Commission was brought into. the situation only
when the proceedings had reached an advanced stage? 0 Even then the Commission
was concerned only with the public interest involved, and displayed little solicitude
as to allocations between classes of security holders? 1 Under Section 77, on the
other hand, the Commission and the courts are specifically required to find that a
plan "is fair and equitable, affords due recognition to the rights of each class of
creditors and stockholders, does not discriminate unfairly in favor of any class of
creditors or stockholders, and will conform to the requirements of the law of the
land regarding the participation of the various classes of creditors and stock-
holders.' 2 Whether or not the Boyd doctrine applies in its technical sense as be-
tween classes of creditors, 13 the language of the statute requires recognition of all
differences in status, not only between creditors and stockholders, but also between
underlying bondholders, on the one hand, and the holders of junior bonds or un-
secured claims, on the otherj..
General Principles Governing Distribution
At the very beginning of the performance of its tasks under Section 77, the Com-
mission was confronted with a claim that, far from extending the Boyd doctrine,
Section 77 had repealed it. The so-called "composition" theory, evolved by counsel
representing debtor interests, was that Section 77 differed from the previous equity
procedure in being a "composition" statute; that the very basis of a composition was
that the debtor retained an interest in his property; and that a composition to which
the requisite proportion of the creditors had assented could not be upset by the courts
because of unduly lenient treatment of the equity interests unless the creditors had
failed to receive as much as they would have received on a liquidation basis.'5 This
* See Swaine, Reorganization of Corporations: Certain Developments of the Last Decade, in SoME L.toAL
PH.sEs or CoapoRATE Fix.A.csxc, REOEcA.55ZA-nO.; AN D REruLAIom (ig3i) 133, 142 fi.0 Interstate Commirce Act S20a, 49 Uy. S. C. S2oa. See dissent of Commissioner Eastman in Chicago,
M. & St. P. R. R. Reorg., 131 L C. C. 673, 701 (1928).
"Securities of C. & F. 1. Ry., 67 I. C. C. 61, 64, (1921); Chicago, M. & St. P. IL R. Reorg., supra note
so. See Reorganization of A., B. & A. Ry., 117 I. C. C. 1, 185 (1926) ("Our principal concern is with
the future of A., B. & A. property as a transportation facility.").
"§77(e).
"This has been much discussed. See Swaine, supra note 9, at i42; Frank, Some Realistic Reflections
on Some Aspects of Corporation Reorganization (1933) 19 VA. L RZv. 54', 553-60; New York Trust Co.
v. Continental & Commercial etc. Bank, supra note 6.
"'Both the Commission and the courts have consistently so held. See New York, N. H. & H. %. L
Reorg. Fin. Doc. No. 30992 (March 22, 1940) mimeo. rep. at xo6; Chicago G. W. R. R. Reorg., 228
I. C. C. 585, 623 (1938); Western Pac. R. R. Reorg, 23v I. C. C. 61, 3oo (1938); and Missouri P.
L L Reorg., 239 1. C. C. 7, 104 (1940); In re N. Y., N. H. & H. R. R., x6 F. Supp. 504, 509 (D. Conn.
1936); In re Chicago & N. W. Ry., 18 F. Supp. 932, 935 (N. D. Ill. 1936). The Commission has
properly given no weight to the omission from the statute as enacted of the words "in the order of their
seniority" contained in H. B. 6249. See Moore, Railroad Fixed Charges in Bankruptcy Proceedings (1939)
47 J- Pox.. Ecose. 100, 17. But Cf. St. Louis-S. F. Ry. Reorg., Fin. Doc. No. so0oB (July 6, 1940) mimeo.
rep. at 78-79.
"' See, e.g., Brief for Debtor (May 22, 1937) Chicago & E. I. Ry. Reorg., Fin. Doc. No. 9952.
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theory received short shrift both from the Commission"6 and from at least one lower
court,1 7 even before the Supreme Court administered the coup de grdce in the Los
Angeles Lumber Products case. 8
While it is easy to say what theory the Commission rejected, it is not so easy to
define precisely the theory that has been adopted. The Commission has not purported
to lay down any neat formula for universal application. Rather it has followed
common law tradition wherein "lines are pricked out by the gradual approach and
contact of decisions on the opposing sides" 19
However, two general statements may be ventured with some assurance. In the
first place, the Commission purports to adhere to a principle of absolute priority, not
only as between creditors and stockholders, but also as between classes of creditors.
Once a hierarchy of interests is established, each class must receive ioo%/ satisfaction
before the next lower class may participate at all. The claim thus satisfied includes, in
the case of creditors, interest as well as principal2 However-and this is a vitally
important corollary-ioo% satisfaction is deemed to be given by ioo% satisfaction in
paper. Priorities are considered satisfied if the full amount of the claim is recognized
in securities of the appropriate dollar amount.2 ' No attempt has been made to insist
that the securities issuable to a senior class must have a prospective market value of
ioo cents on the dollar before a junior class may participate. Indeed, in those few
instances where senior interests have asked for more than ioo% in new securities to
compensate for sacrifices entailed in receiving partial.compensation in income bonds
or stock, such treatment has been denied.
22
"eChicago & E. L Ry. Reorg., 230 1. C. C. 199, 233-234 (1938); Akron, C. & Y. Ry. and Northern
0. Ry. Rcorg., 228 I. C. C. 645, 675 (1938); Denier & IL G. W. IL R. Reorg., 233 I. C. C. 515, 578-579
(1939); Missouri P. IL R. Reorg., 239 L C. C. 7, 132-133 (1940); Chicago, M., St. P. & P. R. R. Reorg.,
supra note 8, at 148; see also note 14, supra.
"In re Chicago G. AV. KL P, 29 F. Supp. 149 (N. D. IMI. 1939).
1
,Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Products Co, Eo Sup. Ct. s (1939). See Dodd, The Los lAngeres
Lumber Products Company Case and Its Implications (1940) 53 Hhnv. L Rzv. 713, 719. An attempt may
now be made to resuscitate this doctrine in certain cases as a result of Mr. Justice Stone's statement in
S. E. C. v. U. S. Realty & Improvement Co., 6o Sup. Ct. 1044, 1052 (1940): "In cases where subordinate
creditors or the stockholders are the managers of its business, the preservation of going-concern value
through their continued management of the business may compensate for reduction of the claims of the
prior creditors without alteration of the managements interest, which would otherwise be required by the
Boyd case." Was this intended to be limited to Chapter X proceedings? What is meant by "the stock-
holders"? What guaranties as to the management's continuance must be offered? One may venture the
prediction that lower courts will be obliged to listen to thousands of hours of argument before this dictum
is finally clarified.
-' Mr. Justice Holmes in Noble State Bank v. Haskell, 219 U. S. 104, 112 (1911).
"See, e.g., Spokane International Ry. Reorg., 228 I. C. C. 387, 402 (1938); Chicago G. W. L IL
Reorg., 228 I. C. C. 585, 618 (x938); Denver & R. G. W. R. K- Reorg., 233 1. C. C. 515, 574 (1939);
Missouri P. R. K. Reorg., 239 I. C. C. 7, 116 (1940); Chicago, M., St. P. & P. R R. Reorg., supra note 8,
at 124. Where the contract rate exceeds current interest rates, the former is recognized up to maturity
or the effective date of the exchange. Chicago G. W. K, K Reorg., 228 I. C. C. 585, o16 (1938). After
maturity a rate of 4% has been approved. Chicago & E. I. Ry. Rcorg., 230 I. C. C. 199, 235 (1938). See
also St. Louis-S. F. Ry. Rcorg., supra note x4, at 67, 75-76.
2 See Chicago G. W. R. R. Rcorg., 228 I. C. C. 585, 623 (1938) (bondholders' priority preserved by
award of "xoo percent of prircipal and interest in some form of new securities, prior to the recognition
of subordinate classes" (italics added)).
"See Brief for Group of Institutional Insestors (May 28, 1938) p. 73, and decision in Chicago, Mil-
waukec, St. P. & P. K. R. Rcorg., upra note 8, at t33-135, 141. In Chicago & N. W. Ry. Reorg.,
1Aw AND CONMhMPOIA&Y NoBtLEMS
The Commission has even gone further. It has not insisted upon allocations
which would reasonably assure that the securities issuable to senior interests should
attain a market value of ioo cents on the dollar before any income of the reorganized
company could be paid to junior interests. An example will clarify what is meant.
Suppose that certain bondholders are to receive 40% of their claim in 4% fixed-in-
terest bonds, 30%o in 4!% income bonds, and 30% in $5 preferred stock, whereas
stockholders receive only comfhon stock. While the market value of the package of
securities issued to the bondholders would not be anything like par .within any
reasonably foreseeable time after the reorganization, the allocation is such that when,
if ever, it should become possible to pay dividends on the common stock issued to
the existing stockholders, the market value of the package of securities awarded to
the bondholders would probably then be such as to enable them to get out whole.
On the other hand, suppose a case where a senior interest receives 40% in income
bonds, 30% in preferred and 30% in common stock, and a junior interest also receives
common stock, although in a smaller amount per dollar of claim. Here the junior
interest may receive some income on the reorganization securities issued to it at a
time when the market value of the securities issued to the senior interest would still
be far from par. Yet the Commission has sustained provisions of this type." In
other words, the Commission believes that priorities may be sufficiently recognized
by a quantitative as distinguished from a. qualitative preference, provided that the
junior interest does -not receive a security ranking prior to the lowest security issued
to the senior interest and receives even that lowest security on a less favorable basis.?'
Just how much less favorable the basis must be is a matter of judgment, the reasoning
behind which is normally not fully disclosed.
The matter may be put in another way. The Commission anticipated the de-
cision in the Los Angeles Lumber Products Company case that a class of stockholders
whose interest is "valueless" may not be accorded a share in the reorganized enter-
prise even if the creditors assent, and has applied this principle not only to stock-
holders - 5 but also to unsecured creditors. 26 On the other hand, if the interest of a
236 1. C. C. 575, 635 (1939), a similar suggestion was rejected. There was ample precedent for the
treatment requested, as, for example, in the highly successful Atchison reorganization of 895. The
difficulty is that this form of treatment leads either to inflation of the capital structure or to radical
limitation of the interests allowed to participate in the plan.
'2Louisiana & N. W, R. t. tReorg., 224 1. C. C. 58, 74-75 (1937), Mod., 230 1. C. C. 171 (1938);
Chicago & E. 1. Ry. Reorg., 23o 1. C. C. 199 (x938); Chicago G. W. L .. Reorg., 228 1. C. C.'585
(1938), mod., 233 1. C. C. 63 (1939); Denver & R. G. W. R. R. Reorg., 233 . C C. 515, 589 (1939);
Chicago, M., St. P. & P. R. L Reorg., supra note 8; Erie P. . Rcorg., Fin. Doe. No. xg55 (April 6,
5940).
In the Chicago Great Western case, the Commission sought (p. 623) to justify this method of alloca-
tion by pointing out that if interest on the income bonds and dividends on the preferred stock were paid,
the existing bondholders would actually receive on the principal amount of their claim more than the
4% contract rate of interest on their bonds. However, as a practical matter, very few bondholders would
regard this chance of increased income as compensatory. But cf. Dodd, supra note 18, at 741-743.
" For a clear statement of this principle, see Missouri P. R. .. Reorg., 239 1. C. 7, 126-127 (1940).
"The Commission wiped out all stock interests in the Spokane International, Oregon, Pacific &
Eastern, Chicago & North Western, Denver & Rio Grande Western, Milwaukee, New Haven, Missouri
Pacific (except for stock in the New Orleans, T. & M. Ry., found to have some value), Western Pacific,
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particular class of stockholders or creditors is found to have "value," the Commission
permits this junior interest to retain a share in the-reorganized enterprise, even though
there is scant probability that the securities issuable to senior creditors will ever have
a market value equal to the amount of their claim, and this participation may even
be in the same type of security as is issuable to senior claimants.
Strong practical considerations support this course, for, if the interest of a par-
ticular class of security holders has "value," their vote must usually be obtained upon
the plan,27 and there is little chance that a class of security holders would approve
a plan utterly excluding them. However, it is well to realize how different this
practice is from the rule applicable between mortgagee and mortgagor outside the
reorganization field. There the Supreme Court has held that not merely principles
of equity but the due process clause forbid infringement of the creditors' right to
insist upon full payment before giving up any of their securityF s
So much for the principles underlying the Commission's treatment of priorities.
Let us now turn to their application.
Kansas City, Kaw Valley & Western, and Savannah & Atlanta proceedings. Stockholders were allowed
a very much deflated interest in Louisiana & N. W. R. R. Reorg., 224 L C. C. 58, 75 (2937), mod., 230
I. C. C. 171, £75 (1938). In the Chicago Great Western and Chicago & Eastern Illinois proceedings
preferred but not common stockholders were allowed to participate. The only major railroad all of whose
stockholders retain some interest under the approved plan is the Erie, where the preferred had a preference
only as to dividends. Infra note 32.
The Commission has generally refused to heed arguments that the business value of preserving the
stock interest of another railroad justified better treatment than would have been awarded otherwise.
See, e.g., Chicago & E. 1. Ry. Reorg., 230 1. C. C. 199, 234-235 (1938); cf. Chicago, I. & L. Ry. Reorg.,
233 . C. C. 335, 349 (1939). But cf. Spokane Internl. Ry. Reorg., 233 I. C. C. 157, 158, x66-168 (1939).
In many cases stockholders, pointing particularly to the reference in 577 (b)( 3 ), have strenuously
urged that they should at least be given warrants to purchase stock in the reorganized company. Their
contentions were rejected in Chicago & N. W. Ry. Reorg., 236 1. C. C. 575, 637-638 (1939); In re Chicago
Great Western R. R., 29 F. Supp. 149, x6o (N. D. 111. 1939); Missouri P. R. R. Reorg., 239 I. C. C. 7,'
132-133 (1940). Miller, C., dissenting, urged the issue of warrants in Chicago, M., St. P. & P. R. R.
Reorg., supra note 8, at 158; New York, N. H. & H. R. R. Reog., supra note 14, at 174. See note 34, infra.
It is somewhat difficult to reconcile with these holdings the results under Chapter XV where, in the
two plans thus far approved by the statutory courts, stockholders have been treated relatively well,
although secured creditors have been forced to make substantial concessions. In re Baltimore & Ohio
R. R., 29 F. Supp. 6o8 (D. Md. 1939), cert. denied, 6o Sup. Ct. 470 (1940); In re Montana, W. & S. R. R.,
32 F. Supp. 200 (D. Mont. 1940). Section 725(3) of Chapter XV requires-the court to find "that the plan
is fair and equitable as an adjustment, affords due recognition to the rights of each class of creditors and
stockholders and fair consideration to each class thereof adversely affected, and will conform to the law
of the land regarding the participation of the various classes of creditors and stockholders.' Since
S. E. C. v. U. S. Realty & Improvement Co., 6o Sup. Ct. £044 (1940) holds that the words "fair and
equitable" in Chapter XI have the same meaning as in Chapter X, it would seem that the quoted words
in Chapter XV have the same meaning as in Section 77, unless the phrase "as an adjustment" is sufficient
to lead to a different result. Cf. Mabaffie; C, dissenting (Eastman, C., concurring) in Montana, W. & S.
R. R. Fin. Adjustment, 236 1. C. C. 325, 338 (1939)-
'Ss Savannah & Atlanta Ry. Rcorg., 224 I. C. C. 197, 2x6 (1937); Spokane International Ry. Reorg.,
.28 I. C. C. 387, 402 (1938); Western Pac. .. R. Reorg., 230 I. C. C. 61, lot (£938); Oregon, P. & E. Ry.
Reorg., 233 L C. C. £87, 194 (1939); Kansas City, K. V. & W. R. R. Reorg., 236 I. C. C. 137, 139
(£939) (on reference back from the court); Missouri P. R. R. Reorg., 239 1. C. C. 7, 129 (1940) (general
unsecured claims against a subsidiary debtor found valueless); St. Louis-S. F. Ry. Reorg., supra note 14,
at 71. Cf. Chicago, I. & L Ry. Reorg., 233 1. C. C. 335, 349 (1939).
" S77(e).
28 Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, 295 U. S. 555, 579 (935); Wright v. Vinton Branch,
300 U. S. 440 (1937).
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Determination of the Classes Entitled to Part'ipate
The initial problem is the ascertainment of the classes of security holders entitled
to participate in sonic form in the reorganized company. 29 Here the critical question
is whether the interest of a particular class of security holders has "value."
The answer to that question follows from the Commission's judgment as to the
total capitalization to be permitted. This is determined on the basis of a review of
valuation and investment data and past and prospective earnings, a subject discussed
in another article in this issue.30 The Commission then subtracts from this total
the securities left undisturbed and those to be issued for new money. There are
next deducted the claims of secured creditors, with accrued interest to the effective
date of the reorganization, and, if the available total permits, the claims of unsecured
creditors, also with accrued interest. If any securities are still available, stockholders
are allowed to participate. Preferred stock has been recognized to the exclusion of
common,3 1 except where, as in the Erie reorganization, the preference of the pre-
ferred stock extended only to dividends3 2  When the permissible capitalization
of the reorganized company ii exhausted, the interest of a class not yet reached is
said to be "valueless," and that class and all classes junior to it are excluded.
Distribution as Between Senior and Junior Interests
The Commission is then faced with the problem of allocating the reorganization
securities among the classes which it has found entitled to participate. Solution of this
problem is necessarily conditioned by the type of securities available. The exacting
task of accurately reflecting priorities has been made still more difficult because of
" There are of course the even more basic problems of the validity and amounts of climts, their
relative priorities and their classification, as to which the Commission, under 577(c)(7), accepts and
follows the court's decision. Kansas City, K. V. & W. R. R. Rorg., 221 I. C. C. 15, 26 (1937); cf.
Missouri P. R. R. Reorg., 239 1. C. C. 7, 120 (1940). There has as yet been little litigation with respect
to classification as such. See, however, J. P. Morgan & Co. v. Missouri P. R. K, 85 F. (ad) 351 (C. C A.
8th, 1936), Cetn. denied, 299 U. S. 604 (1936). The more common problem is that of priority, particularly
of unsecured claims destined to a precarious junior position unless some special equity or statutory right
to a preferred status can be established. Disputes frequently arise as to the relative priority of tax and
other governmental claims, In re Denver & R. G. W. R. Co., 27 F. Supp. 983 (D. Colo. x939); In re
Chicago, M., St. P. & P. R. R., 27 F. Supp. 685 (N. D. Ill. 1939), of claims alleged to fall within the
"six-months rule," In re Chicago &, N. W. Ry., 11o F. (ad) 425 (C. C. A. 7 th, 1940), and of
personal injury claims of employees and others, In re New York, N. H. & H. I. P,'92 F. (ad) 428
(C. C. A. 2d, 1937), cert. denied, 303 U. S. 650 (1938) (passenger); Thompson v. Glover, 94 F. (ad)
544 (C. C. A.. 8th, x938) (passenger); Central Hanover Bk. & Trust Co. v. Williams, 95 F. (2d) axo
(C. C. A. 8th, 1938) (employee); Thompson v. Siratl, 95 F. (ad) 214 (C. C. A. 8th, 1938) (employee,
"six-months" rule discussed). On the "six-months rule," see FitzGibbon, The Present Statur of the Six
Months Rule (1934) 34 CoL. L Rav. 23o 0-934); FiNLETrEx, BaaNxswrRT REORGANIzATION (1939)
373-385.
Almost every plan report of the Commissiun under S77 has provided for either payment in cash or
assumption by the new company and payment in the ordinary course of business of claims found prior
to secured claims, including reorganization and trustees' expenses, taxes, "six-months" claims, and clain&
based on trustees' certificates secured by a prior lien. Claims assumed have kept their relative priority.
See, e.g., Denver & R. G. W. R. R. Reorg., 233 I. C. C. 515, 588 (1939). In Chicago S. S. & S. B. K. K.
Reorg., 212 I. C. C. 547, 565 (1936), "aix-months" claims were awarded only 5-year 5% notes.
"See Warner, Some Financial and Economic Problems in Railroad Recapitalizations, infra, p. 438.
'x Chi-ago G. W. R. R. Reorg., a8 I. C. C. 585, 626-627 (1938); Chicago & E. I. Ry. Reorg., 230
I. C. C. 199, 231-234 (1938).
"' Erie R. R. Rcorg., Fin. Doc. No. 11915 (April 6, 1940), mimeo. rep. at 124.
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the Commission's proper refusal to sanction an unduly complicated capital struc-
ture."3 The Commission's policy has been, in general, to avoid both divisional liens
and exaggerated stratification. Normally, the securities authorized in reorganization,
to satisfy the claims of holders of the numerous divisional and system bonds,
and various classes of unsecured claims and stock, consist of fixed-interest bonds,
contingent-interesi bonds, and preferred and common stock.3 ' The nature and
amounts of these securities are determined largely by economic considerations, but
also with some reference to the problem of distribution."
The allocation of reorganization securities under the Commission's principle of
xoo% paper satisfaction creates little difficulty where the corporation has a capital
structure in which securities are arranged in layers. The Chicago Great Western
reorganization will serve as an example."6 Apart from equipment trusts, a small
terminal mortgage, a divisional mortgage of nominal amount, and indebtedness to
the Railroad Credit Corporation and the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, all to
be assumed or paid, existing capitalization consisted of one issue of first mortgage
bonds and preferred and common stock. The capitalization approved consisted, in
addition to securities which were to be assumed, of First Mortgage 4s, General In-
come Mortgage 4!/2s, 5% $50 par preferred stock, and $50 par common stock. Over
a third of the new First Mortgage 4s were to be sold for cash. There were allocated
to the existing bondholders the balance of the first mortgage bonds, all of the income
bonds, all of the preferred stock and enough of the common stock so that each bond-
holder received ioo% papei satisfaction for his claim, principal and interest. There
remained common stock with total par value equal to approximately one fourth of
the par value of the outstanding preferred. This was awarded to the preferred stock-
holders, the common stockholders being excluded from the reorganization.
Parallel Liens
Simplicity of this sort, however, is far from typical of the major railroad reorgan-
izations which have come before the Commission. In the Missouri Padfi4C case, the
" The Commission has been quite aware of this effect of its policy. See Chicago, M., St. P. & P. P..
Reorg., supra note 8, at 140; Missouri P. R. R. Reorg., 239 I. C. C. 7, 95 (1940)-
"' This general statement is, of course, subject to numerous exceptions. Certain securities, notably
equipment and terminal obligations, have usually been left undisturbed. Also certain types of new
securities have been authorized in addition to those mentioned in the text. In the Missouri, Erie, New
Haven and Chicago & North Western proceedings collateral notes were provided, and, in the last, par-
ticipating preferred stock and "split-coupon bonds, the commutable interest becoming fixed if earned for
a certain period. The most complicated financial structure authorized by the Commission was in the
Missouri Padfic proceedings where, under the approved plan, the fixed-interest and income bonds and
the preferred stock were each divided into two classes. In the following proceedings, the issue of warrants
was approved. Erie IL I. Reorg., supra note 32, at rig; Akron C. & Y. Ry. and Northern 0. Ry. Reorg.,
228 J. C. C. 645, 673 (1938); Kansas City, K. V. and W. I. I. Reorg., 236 1. C. C. 137, 542 (1939).
See, however, note 25, supra.
"Missouri P. I R. Reorg., 239 I. C. C., 7, 1o8 (1940); New York, N. H. & H. R. R. Reorg., supra
note 14, at 107.
"Chicago G. W. I. R. Reorg., 228 I. C. C. 585 (1938); mod., 233 1. C. C. 63 (939), confirmed,
29 F. Supp. 149 (N. D. II1. 1939). For a helpful compilation of old and new or proposed capital struc-
tures of the major railroads in reorganization, see McGiNsms, GUImE To DEsAus Drz RTAitoAD Bownr Ay
R atoAD REORoAzMATXON SEctIcTEs (2d Issue, 1940).
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court had found that there were 55 different classes of creditors and stockholders.8 1
The difficulty, moreover, lies not in the mere number of classes, but in the fact that
the secured creditors hold liens on different properties-what the Commission has
called "parallel liens." In cases of this sort, the allocation of the reorganization securi-
ties presents problems of a most complex and intriguing character,
An initial question is the legal problem of determining the property on which a
particular class of securities has a prior claim. The procedure for handling this ques-
tion has not been identical in the various reorganization proceedings. In some cases
disputes as to liens have been largely fought out in and settled by the reorganization
court before the Commission has issued its plan s In these, of course, the Commission
has followed the court's decision. In other cases, however, there has been no judicial
determination and the Commission has been required either to make a preliminary
determination or to recognize the existence of doubts justifying some compromisc.89
The Commission is then faced with the task of evaluating the properties subject
to the respective liens, giving "due consideration to the earning power of the prop-
erty, past, present, and prospective, and all other relevant facts." 40 The difficulty of
this task is enhanced by the fact that normally no separate records as to the financial
results of the operation of the various mortgage and leased line divisions have been
kept.
A principal device used to ascertain the economic value of respective mortgage
divisions has been the formula for segregating revenues and expenses-a method
which, indeed, is mentioned in the statute itself. 1 In some cases, notably in the
New Haven reorganization, the court has referred the terms of a proposed formula
to the Commission pursuant to Section 77(c)(1).4 2 In others, such as the Erie, the
Chicago & North Western, and the Frisco, a formula applied without Commission or
court approval has been recognized by the Commission in its report on the plan.4 s
A segregation formula purports to show the earnings of each mortgage division
as actually operated as part of the system. This may or may not be a fair basis for
treatment in a reorganization plan. In some cases the earnings shown by such a
"'Missouri P. IL R Reorg., 239 1. C. C. 7, 28-32 (1940).
$5In re New York, N. H. & H. R. R., 27 F. Supp. 392 (D. Conn. 1938), afl'd, 104 F. (ad) 1018
(C. C. A. 2d, 1939); In re New York, S. & W. I. R., 30 F. Supp. 257 (D. N. J. 1939); al'd as mod.,
1o9 F. (ad) 988 (C. C. A. 3 d, 1940), cert. denied, 60 Sup. Ct. 1075 (1940).
!' Western Pac. R. R. Reorg., 23o I. C. C. 61, 97-100 (1938) (Commission noted that its ruling was
subject to final adjudication); Denver & R. G. W. R. R. Reorg., 233 . C. C. 515, 568-570 (1939);
Chicago & N. W. Ry. Reorg., 236 1. C. C. 575, 640 (1939); Chicago, M. St. P. & P. It. R. Itorg., supra
note 8, at 136-141.
40 577(e). Various problems of valuation under 577 have been discussed at length in Spaeth &
Windle, Valuation of Railroads under Section 77 of the Bankruptcy Act (1938) 32 ILL. L. REv. 517
and in 2 BONBEi-r, Ta VALuAflox oF Potopaarv (1937) 864 ff.
,1 577(c)(1o) and (xx).
"New York, N. H. & H. R. R. Reorg., 224 I. C. C. 723 (1938); Chicago, 1. & L. Ry. Reorg., aa8
I. C. C. 209 (1938); New York, S. & W. R. R. Reorg., 236 I. C. C. 425 (1939).
" In the Rock Island proceeding some aspects of the formula have been litigated in the courts with-
out reference to the Commission. In re Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry., io8 V. (2d) 410 (C. C. A. 7 th, 939).
For a brief discussion of the formula problem, see Meck & Masten, Railroad Leases and Reorganization: 1
(1940) 49 YALE L J. 626, 640 f.
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study may be much more than the line could obtain except as part of the system,
e.g, in the case of an alternate bridge line built to handle more economically traffic
produced by other mortgage divisions.4 4 On the other hand, expenses of operating
a line as part of a system may be greater than if the line were independently
operaied, 4  and in almost all cases, the segregation formula will charge a division
with certain expenses which would not be saved if the division were to be severed
from the system.
In order to appraise possibilities such as these, studies are commonly prepared to
show the gain or loss to the mortgage division and to the remainder of the system
if the line were to be severed. While severance studies necessarily involve much in
the way of assumption and estimate, particularly on matters such as the routing of
traffic, and their results are thus markedly characterized by what Mr. Justice Holmes
termed "a delusive exactness," 4 6 they have often, and properly, been given weight
by the Commission.47
Another type of study which has received consideration is the contributed traffic
study. This consists of analyzing the amount of traffic originated and terminated by
each mortgage division for the rest of the system. 56 far as concerns traffic which
would be lost to the system if the mortgage division were to be severed, the con-
siderations behind this are similar to those in the severance study. And as to traffic
that would not be lost, there seems to be a belief that a line originating or terminating
traffic is of superior stature to one that merely carries it-a recognition of the "busi-
ness-getter." 48 Objections have been made to studies of this type on the ground that
the division originating or terminating traffic frequently does not itself either
control or attract such traffic. In any event, such a study at least serves partially
to compensate for the frequently inadequate terminal allowances in segregation
formulas.4 9
Other factors, such as traffic density and "strategic value," have also received some
1This apparently was the case as to several of the mortgage divisions in the Chicago & North
Westrn reorganization and as to the Erie & Jersey and the Genesee River lines in the Erie reorganization.
Compare the position of the Denver & Salt Lake and the Denver & Salt Lake Western in the Denver &
Rio Grande Western proceeding.
"' See. e.g., the discussion of the Danbury & Norwalk bonds in New York, N. H. & H. R. R. Reorg.,
supra note r4, at xx8-xig. " Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U. S. 312, 343 (2921).
"See Chicago & N. W. Ry. Reorg., 236 L C. C. 575, 632, 641-642 (s939); New York, N. H. &
H. IL R. Reorg., supra note 14, at ixg; Erie R. R. Reorg., supra note 32, at x16. For a brief discussion
of severance studies, see Meek & Masten, supra note 43, at 645 f.
" See, e.g., Missouri P. R. R. Reorg., 239 I. C. C. 7, 125 (1940); Denver & IL G. W. R. R. Reorg., 233
I. C. C. 515, 572 (x939)-
"7The difficult question of what in a particular case is the terminal division and what is a proper
allowance to it for its admittedly higher than road-haul expenses has been much litigated. New York,
N. H. & H. R. R. Rcorg., 224 I. C. C. 723 (1938); N. Y., S. & W. R. R. Reorg., 236 1. C. C. 425 (1940);
Palmer v. Palmer, 104 F. (2d) xsx (C. C. A. 2d, 593o), cert. denied, 6o Sup. CL 120, 121 (1939).
What constructive mileage allowance, if any, should be awarded the Dotsero cut-off has been a central
problem in Denver & R. G. W. R. R. Reorg., 2.33 L C. C. 515, 567-568 (939). Commissioner Eastman,
dissenting, decried the failure to make an allowance to the Old Colony for its heavy passenger terminal
expenses, in New York, N. H. & H. R. R. Reorg., supra note 14, at 183 ff.
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recognition.50 While the data as to physical value are usually, if not always, men-
tioned, the regard which the Commission pays them is not altogether dear5 2
When a mortgage or leased line division's earnings, as develop.ed by various
studies, exceed the fixed charges on its divisional bonds, such excess eArnings are
customarily transferred to the next senior lien.53  On the other hand, wliere there is
a deficit on a division subject to a divisional mortgage and one or more mortgages
covering other properties as well, the question arises as to which, if any, of the
junior liens shall be charged with this loss. A somewhat similar problem is presented
where a branch subject to a system mortgage is operating at a loss. May the bond-
holders disclaim the branch line as security? Although these situations have existed
in several cases, no settled principle seems to have been evolved.54
No uniform method has been or could be adopted for the translation of all these
studies into an allocation of reorganization securities. Usually the Commission has
leaned heavily upon allocations made in the plan filed by the debtor or in a plan
filed by a group of institutional bondholders, making such adjustments as are re-
quired to adapt these to the somewhat contracted capital structure fixed by the
Commission, or as are deemed appropriate in the light of the evidence adduced by
other parties.O5
"It has been stated that in determining the relative values of divisions "it is proper to consider the
subjects of contributed traffic, strategic position and prospective earnings, or any other relevant factors...."
In re Chicago, I1. & P. Ry., xio F. (2d) 395, 399 (C. C. A. 7th, 1940). Weight was given to
"strategic value" in New York, N. H. & H. R. R. Reorg., supra note 14, at i8 (Boston & N. Y.
Air Line bonds) and at 115-116 (Harlem River & Pt. Chester bonds). See also Chicago, M., St. P. & P.
. R. Reorg., supra note 8, at 233 (Gen. Mtg-e. bonds). Weight was given to adverse factors in id. at 78,
144-145 (Chicago, M. & G. R. R. and Terre Haute bonds, but the treatment of the former later improved
in id. (June 4, 1940), mimeo. rep. at 36-40).
i" Compare, e.g., Chicago & N. W. Ry. Reorg., 236 1. C. C. 575, 59o, 635-636 (1939), with New
York, N. H. & H. R. R. Reorg., supra note 14, at i 18. See St. Louis-S. F. Ry. Reorg., supra note 14, at 44"45.
"
1 Chicago, M., St. P. & P. R. . Reorg., supra note 8, at x3x; Denver & R. G. W. K. K. Reorg, 233
L C. C. 515, 570 (1939).
"
t Denver & IL G. W. R. K. Reorg., 233 1. C. C. 515, 572 (1939); New York, N. H. & H. IL IL
Reorg., supra note 14, at 19, 119-12o; Chicago, M., St. P. & P. K. K. Rorg., supra tsote 8, at 127-128,
137-1538. Cf. St. Louis-S. F. Py. Reorg., supra note 14, at 64-65.
SlThe debtor m'tst file a plan. 577(d). A plan may also be filed by the trustee or by other parties.
Ibid. In most proceedings involving nmajor systems, including the Spokane International, Western Pacific,
Denver & Rio Grande, Chicago and Eastern Illinois, Chicago & North Western, Missouri Pacific, Mil.
waukee, New Haven and Erie proceedings, a group of institutional bondholders has intervened and filed
a plan. Notably in the Chicago & North Western proceedings, the Commission used the group plan as its
starting point for many purposes, including the allocation of securities. In the New Haven case,
the Commission followed more closely the debtor's allocations. The favorable recognition accorded plans
filed by such groups is doubtless due in part to the fact that, as their interests are usually spread over the
various bonds of the debtor, the framers of the plan have had every motive to make a fair allocation.
It has been remarked that their active participation will do much to force "the practice to conform to
the theory ?f priority" as laid down by the Supreme Court. Spaeth & Winks, The Boyd Cafe and See.
J10n 77 (1938) 32 IL. L Rav. 769, 770. A debtor's plan frequently is dictated by a parent company
seeking primarily to preserve its own stock interest. On the theory that debtors' plans have failed to be
fair to all parties, it has been suggested to a Senate Committee that S77 should be amended so as no
longer to permit their filing. Additional Report of the Committee on Interstate Commerce Pursuant to
S. Res. 71, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. (x939), Rep. No. 25, Pt. 6, pp. 26-27. However, in the Chicago
Great Western and Louisiana & North West proceedings the debtor's was the only complete plan filed, and
such a plan provided the basis for the Commission's report in the Chicago and Eastern Illinois proceeding
where the group of institutions filed a plan of its own but later supported the debtor's amended plan.
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Perhaps the closest approach to adherence to a "scientific" method of distribu-
tion, at least so far as concerned the allotment of fixed-interest bonds, was in the
New Haven reorganization. The starting point was the segregation formula which
the Commission and the court had approved.56 This formula had been applied for
the year ended May 31, 1937. The proportion of each division's earnings to those of
the system, as determined by such application, was then applied, with appropriate
adjustments, to the average earnings for the years 1933-1938, inclusive. The result
was termed the "adjusted segregated earnings" of each division.5 7 The plan pro-
vided that two small mortgages, each having an early maturity and secured by
property having a value far in excess of the amount of the mortgage, one on an
essential terminal property and the other with adjusted segregated earnings many
times in excess of interest requirements, should be paid in cash.5" Three other issues,
one a terminal mortgage, and two others with adjusted segregated earnings many
times their interest requirements, were to be left undisturbed, with accrued interest
to be paid in cash, since "it would appear inequitable to ask the holders of any of
these bonds to exchange them for reorganization securities which admittedly would
not be rated on the date of their issue as valuable as the bonds: '5 ' The debtor had
proposed that existing bonds be allotted fixed-interest bonds to the extent that their
adjusted segregated earnings covered interest charges 1.5 times, and this principle
was generally applied by the Commission in dealing with the remaining bonds.60
A more complicated method, putting greater stress on severance studies and at-
tempting to take account of differences in the relative performance of particular
mortgage divisions in good and bad years, was adopted by the committees represent-
ing life insurance companies and savings banks and largely approved by the Con
mission in the Chicago & North Western reorganization.pl The committee's experts
and the debtor had prepared segregation, severance and "contributive" income studi.es.
on the basis of which the committee's experts had arrived at a "final measure of
earnings." In the case of five bridge lines which had been built for the purpose of
reducing operating costs by diverting traffic from existing routes, the severance studies
were used as the "final measure of earnings.:" 2 In the case of a mortgage division
which originated and terminated a substantial proportion of traffic and also handled
some bridge traffic, a weight of approximately two was given to the segregation study
and a weight of one to the severance studies.6 s All these studies were made for the
.year 1936. However, it was found that, during depression years, the earning power
of the bridge lines was relatively greater than that of one of the system mortgages,
s New York, N. H. & H. R. R. Reorg, 224 . C. C. 723 (1938); In re New York, N. H. & H. R. R.,
Record, p. 4399 (D. Conn., x938).
"New York, N. H. & H. R. R.. Reorg, supra note 14, at og-110.
"Id. at 112-113.
" Id. at 113-114. The Harlem River and Port Chester bonds were also left undisturbed with accrued
interest to be satisfied, after application of deposited cash, by fixed-interest bonds. Id. at rxz-xi6.
"I'd. at 114-120.
SChicago & N. W. Ry. Reorg., 236 L C. C. 575 (x939).
"See Life Insurance Group Committee and Mutual Savings Bank Group Committee Brief (July 14,
1938), Chicago & N. W. Ry. Reorg., pp. 191-193. MId. at x93-z94.
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and that as earnings increased, the earning power of the system mortgages increased
rel.dively much faster than that of the bridge lines. Consequently, as a basis for the
distribution of fixed-interest bonds, on which interest is payable even in times of
severe depression, an estimate was made as to the "final measure of earnings" for an
average depression year. On the other hand, the allocation of income bonds was
based upon an estimate of the "final measure of earnings" for a normal prospective
year. The Commission followed the former method so far as concerned the split-
coupon bonds which it authorized; but whereas the committees, after distributing
fixed-interest and income bonds, had allocated preferred stock to fill out roo% prin-
cipal and interest of all mortgage claims and had allotted common stock in partial
compensation to the bondholders for the loss of rights to income by acceptance for
a part of their debt of income bonds and preferred stock which were not fully
cumulative, the Commission eliminated this last-mentioned allotment, and allocated
income bonds and preferred and common stock on the basis of the committee's
allocation of income bonds and preferred stock, with various minor adjustments."
Another method of allocation, followed notably in the Erie and Missouri Pacific
reorganizations and to some extent in the Milwaukee proceeding, might be termed
the method of comparison. The report in the Erie reorganization will serve as an
example. The debtor and an institutional group proposed plans both of which
provided that the Prior-Lien bonds, which were secured by the Erie's Consolidated
Mortgage, should receive ioO% of principal and accrued interest in new First-
Mortgage fixed-interest bonds. This was supported by analyses of the valuation and
earnings data concerning the property subject to the Consolidated Mortgage and was
adopted by the Commission. The General-Lien bonds were also secured by the Con-
solidated Mrtgage, but in subordination to the Prior-Lien bonds. However, the
value- of the security was deemed by the Commission to be sufficient to entitle the
General-Lien bonds to share to the extent of 22.7% of their claim in the new fixed-
interest bonds.65 The balance of their allotnient was in income bonds and preferred
stock. The Erie & Jersey and Genesee River divisional bonds claimed a right to
better treatment than the Prior-Lien bonds. After comparison of the three issues,
the claim was denied in respect of the Erie & Jersey bonds; but granted, to the
extent of allowing a higher interest rate, in respect of the Genesee River bonds. The
Convertible bonds stood apart because of the special nature of their collateral security,
which consisted principally of stock in an anthracite coal company and an anthracite
carrying branch line. Its value was examined, and treatment deemed appropriate
was accorded. The Refunding and Improvement bonds were secured by the pledge
of substantial amounts of General-Lien and Convertible bonds, by certain additional
collateral security, and by a junior lien on the bulk of the system. The Commission
awarded them the fixed-interest bonds, income bonds and preferred stock issuable
in respect of the collateral, and allotted common stock for the remainder of the claim.
'Id. at 196-2oo; Chicago & N. W. Ry. Reorg, 236 L C. C. 575, 632-636 (x939). See also note
22, stPrimA
"S A striking example of the consequences 'of the principle of zoo% paper satisfaction.
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However, the Refunding and Improvement bonds were allowed to take this stock at
$37.17 per share as against $4 per share in the case of unsecured creditors--thus
recognizing some value in the junior lien position. 8
Special problems have arisen as to the treatment of strong underlying divisional
issues. Occasionally the Commission has authorized the satisfaction of such issues
by payment in cash.67 We have already referred to the Commission's statement in
the New Haven proceeding, that the position of certain divisional issues was so
strong that the bondholders could not be compensated even by ioo% in new system
first-mortgage bonds, and that fairness required that the issues remain undisturbed. s
The Chicago & North Western reorganization plan provided that the Sioux City
and Pacific Ist 3Ys of 1936 and the Des Plaines Valley 1st 4/s of 1947 be exchanged
for new 4% divisional bonds due in 1969 whereas the best security issued to other
bondholders was a general mortgage bond due in 1989 with 2 / fixed interest and
an additional iY2/ interest which should become fixed when the commutable
interest had been earned and payable. for three successive years.0 9 A different ex-
pedient employed in the Missouri Pacific reorganization, which had the advantage
of avoiding the perpetuation of divisional liens, was the issue of short-term collateral
notes secured by pledge of first-mortgage bonds and to bear such interest as to permit
them to sell at par.70
In other cases, however, apparently strong divisional liens have not fared vo well.
In the Denver & Rio Grande Western proceeding, although the evidence showed-
that the earnings of the Denver's western lines were more than adequate to cover
interest charges on the bonds representing first liens on such lines, the Commission
not only rejected suggestions of a separate western-division mortgage and of a special
series of short-term fixed-interest bonds with an interest rate and other features in-
tended to insure their selling at par, but allotted no fixed-interest bonds at all"
The Commission justified this treatment on the grounds that all the permissible
fixed-interest bonds were required to be issued to provide new money for the pay-
ment of trustees' certificates and reorganization expenses and redemption of the First-
Mortgage bonds of the Denver & Salt Lake and to provide satisfaction in full for
the notes held by the R. F. C. The Commission stated:7
The approval of the issue of new first-mortgage bonds to the Finance Corporation,
while the debtor's bondholders are to receive none' of such bonds, is justified, in our opin-
Erie R. I. Reorg., supra note 32, at 10-117, 140.
1 E.g., Evansville Belt Ist 5's of !940 in Chicago & E. I. Ry. Reorg., 23o 1. C. C. 571, 573 (1939);
N. Y. & Erie 2d and 3d mrge. bonds in Erie L R. Reorg., supra note 32, at ix9; and N. Y. & New Eng-
land-Boston Terminal bonds and Dutchess County bonds in New York, N. H. & H. R. R. Reorg., supra
note 14 at 112-113.' Compare the treatment of Mason City & Fort Dodge bonds in Chicago G. W. R. R.
Reorg., 233 I. C. C. 63, 68 (9g39)-
ab New York, Providence & Boston, the Naugatuck, and the Providence Terminal bonds. New York,
N. H. & H. R. R. Reorg., supra note 14, at 113-14. See also the treatment of The Harlem River and
Port Chester bonds. Id. at 115-116.
" Chicago & N. W. Ry. Reorg., 236 I. C. C. 575, 633, 647-649 (1939).
"Missouri P. R. IL Reorg., 239 I. C. C. 7, IOX-102 (1940)-
"Denver & L G. IV. R. R. Reorg., 233 L C. C. 515, 574-575 (2939).
" Id. at 576.
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ion, by considerations beyond the estimated value of the particular securities under pledge.
Not only is the Finance Corporation in possession of the stocks of the Salt Lake and the
Salt t.ake Western, and thus in position to veto the consolidation of properties which
forms the basis of the plan, but it has indicated that it will, if satisfied with the plan, agree
to underwrite the financing necessary to redeem the Salt Lake bonds outstanding in the
hands of the public, the payment of trustee's certificates, and the cash required for reor.
ganization expenses, etc., a total of $7,443,675.
Again, in the Milwaukee reorganization, the Commission awarded the Mil-
waukee & Northern Ist 4Yzs only 70% in First Mortgage 4% bonds and 30% in
General Mortgage 4V2% income bonds, although interest in 1936 was estimated to
have been earned about four times on one theory and about three times on another,
and testimony had been introduced to show that the Northern could operate suc-
cessfully as an independent road or in association with some other system.73 The
unexpressed reason behind this was, of course, that the amount of available fixed-
interest bonds was so small that the existing Milwaukee General Mortgage bonds,
secured by a first lien on over 6,ooo miles of lines east of the Missouri River and
which had passed unscathed through the 1927 reorganization, could be given only
250/ in that type of security. Hard cases mean hard treatment even for strong
divisional issues.-
While the "value" of the particular property subject to the mortgage is given great
weight in determining the amount and type of reorganization securities to be ex-
changed for existirig bonds, the Commission does not appear to have been very much
concerned with changes in lien position for the future. For example, in the Etie
reorganization, the Prior-Lien bonds were obliged to share the new first mortgage,
to the extent of nearly 5o%/, with divisional and junior issues.74 Nicety in the preser-
vation of lien position becomes impracticable in the light of the Commission's prin-
ciples of paper satisfaction and its. aversion to undue complication of the financial
structure. Substantially no weight appears to have been given to differences in
existing coupon rates.7 *
"Chicago, M. St. P. & P. R. Co. Reorg., supra note 8, at 129-131. In spite of this treatment of the ist
4%'s, the Consolidated Mortgage bonds of the Milwaukee & Northern, whose main value from the
standpoint of earnings was in their second lien. on the same property, received 25% in new fixed-interest
bonds.
"In only a few instances has the Commission sought to explaim the compensation given or reparation
required because of changed lien treatment. Chicago G. W. .. R. Reorg., 228 1. C. C. 585, 623 (1938);
New York, N. L & H. R. . Reorg., supra note 14, at 134-135; Erie IL PL Reorg., supra note 32, at
ioB-aix; Missouri P. R. PL Reorg., Fin. Doc. No. 9918 (April 9, 1940), mimeo. rep. at 22-23.
' See, e.g., Chicago & N. W. Ry. Reorg., 236 . C. C. 575, 636-637 (x939) (general mortgage bonds
bearing 3 %4, 4, 4%, 4% and 5% interest given like treatment); New York, N. H. & H. P. . Reorg.,
supra note 14, at xx6-xx8 (New England mortgage bonds bearing 4 and 5% interest given like treat-
ment). The frequent lack of discussion of.changes in rates of interest in the Commission's current reports
contrasts sharply with the emphasis placed on relative income position in Boabright & Bergerman, Two
Rival Theories of Priority Rights (1928) a8 Cor- L Rxv. 127. See 2 Bommma or, THE VALUATION oF
PROPERTv (1937) 867-868, for a re-examination of the author's earlier views concerning the "relative"
priority theory. Cf. St. Louis-S. F. Ry. Reorg., supra note 14, at 81-83.
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Claims Secured by Collateral
Special problems have arisen in the case of claims secured by collateral. These
claims fall into two general classes-collateral trust bond issues, and collateral loans
by commercial banks, the Railroad Credit Corporation, and the Reconstruction
Finance Corporation.
Collateral trust bond issues can likewise be roughly divided into two categories.
In one class, the bonds are secured in part by the pledge of a smaller face amount of
senior securities and in part by a junior mortgage lien. Here, the usual treatment has
been to allot the reorganization securities that would have been issuable in respect of
the pledged collateral, and to fill out the ioo% paper satisfaction with some type of
junior security.7 5 In the other class the bonds are secured only by pledge of a larger
face amount of system securities. A good instance is found in the New Haven reor-
ganization, where $15,302,600 principal amount of Fifteen-Year 6% Secured Gold
Bonds were secured by pledge of $23,ooo,ooo principal amount of the Debtor's First
and Refunding bonds. Although the principal and interest of the Secured 6s was
only S8,5i6,I46, there would have been issuable for the pledged First and Refunding
bonds, $5,635,ooo, or 20% of principal and accrued interest, in fixed-interest bonds,
$Ii,27o,ooo, or 40% of principal and accrued interest, in income bonds, and another
$1,270,ooo in preferred stock, or a total of $28,i75,ooo. The Commission concluded
that the inflation of the capital structure that would result from issuance of these
securities would be undesirable, and that the holders of the Secured 6s should be
required to cut down their participation to the amount of their claim, being com-
pensated by an appropriate increase in the proportion of higher grade securities.
Since the fixed-interest and income bonds issuable in respect of the pledged collateral
would alone have nearly equaled the amount of the claim, the solution had to take
the form of eliminating preferred stock and increasing the proportion of fixed-
interest bonds. In other words, the problem was to determine how $18,516,146 must
be divided as between fixed-interest and income bonds in order to produce a total
value equal to the value of the $5,635,ooo in fixed-interest bonds, $i,27o,ooo in in-
come bonds, and $u,27oooo in preferred stock that would have been issuable for
the pledged collateral. Since the Commission found the evidence inadequate to
permit such a determination, it cut the Gordian knot by raising the proporion of
the fixed-interest bonds to be issued in respect of the pledged bonds in the same
ratio as the amount of the collateral bore to the debt. That is, since the debt was
secured by approximately iY2 times its face amount in pledged bonds, the proportion
of fixed-interest bonds issuable in respect of the pledged bonds was made 3o% instead
of the 2o applicable in the case of bonds publicly held. This resulted in the issuance
of $8,452,50o of fixed-interest bonds, or slightly more than 45/ of the debt, and the
balance was made up by income bonds.76 Similar treatment was accorded a number
"'As in Erie R. R. Reorg., supra note 32, at- xi6 (Refunding and Improvement bonds).
"SNew York, N. H. & H. R. R. Reorg., supra note 14, at 120-122.
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of the bank creditors."7 While the method was admittedly illogical, it seems rea-
sonably clear that the collateral bondholders were not unfairly treated. This example
also serves to illustrate why many plans have proposed to limit the ratio in which
the reorganized company may pledge its bonds.
The treatment of collateral loans made by commercial banks, the Railroad Credit
Corporation, and the Reconstruction Finance Corporation has, of course, varied in
accordance with the nature, amount and value of the collateral. In some cases the
sheer amount of the collateral has been such that the Commission has awarded
payment in cash. Thus, in the Chicago Great Western reorganization, it was found
that, on the basis of the par value of existing bonds held by each, the claim of the
R. F. C., principal and interest, was covered 3.28 times and that of the R. C. C., prin-
cipal and interest, 3.67 times, whereas that of existing bondholders was secured only
.87 times due to the accumulated interest; Accordingly, the Commission held that
full cash payment should be made to the R. F. C. and the R. C. C.'8 The collateral
position of the banks and the R. C. C. in the Erie reorganization was likewise deemed
to justify full payment in cash.7 9 This does not seem to have been as clear as the
Commission assumed, at least so far as the R. C. C. was concerned. Although the
R. C. C.'s collateral would have entitled it to reorganization securities greatly in excess
of the face amount of its claim, this excess would have consisted almost wholly of
common stock. In other words, while the money to pay the R. C. C. will come from
the sale 'of collateral-tfust notes secured by a pledge of securities of the sane issue
as those awarded senior creditors, the benefit of retirement of .the loan will inure
chiefly to junior creditors and stockholders.
Another situation presented is where a note is secured by salable non-system col-
lateral. In one case where this had a market value at least approximating the
face of the note, but the company's finances were not such as to justify cash payment
and the sale of the collateral would have been inadvisable from its standpoint, the
Commission approved the issuance of new short-term notes secured by the existing
collateral 80 In another case non-system collateral, which was only part of the secu-
rity, was ordered sold, the proceeds to be applied in reduction of the debt.81
A somewhat different problem is presented where the R. F. C., as a condition to
agreeing to finance a reorganization, has insisted upon better treatment of its claims
than that to which it would otherwise have been entitled. This is reminiscent of the
old equity receivership problem as to the extent to which the value of securities
offered to stockholders might exceed the amount of the new money to be paid. We
have already referred to the Denver & Rio Grande Western proceeding, wheie the
allocation of first-mortgage bonds to the R. F. C. in satisfaction of its existing claim
"Id. at 125-126.
"' Chicago G. W. . . Reorg., 228 1. C. C. 585, 617 (1938).
" Erie I. R. Rcorg., supra note 32, at r18.
soNew York, N. H. & H. R. R. Reorg., supra note 14, at 122-124 (claims of the R. C. C. and the
R. F. C.). The I. C. C. rejected as not "fair and equitable" the debtor's proposal that they merely be
awarded fixed-interest bonds.
*1 Chicago & N. W. Ry. Reorg., 236 . C. C. 575, 63, (939).
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prevented the making of any such allocation to divisional bonds that were earning
their interest.82 In the Western Pacific reorganization, on rehearing, the Commission
awarded to the notes held by the R. F. C., which were secured for the most part by
junior securities, the same treatment as First Mortgage bonds in consideration
of (x) the purchase of the new first-mortgage bonds by the R. F. C. at par and (2) the
value of the collateral securing the notes.83
Opinions will differ as to the propriety of this practice. On the one hand, it can
be said that the new bonds will not sell at par, and that even if they would, an
investment banker would certainly require a commission for underwriting them-
if, indeed, an underwriting over so long a period as is involved in a reorganization
under Section 77 could be obtained at all. Against this, it may be argued that the
improved position which the R. F. C. is obtaining as to its existing claim may develop
to be out of all proportion.to a fair underwriting fee.84
We have endeavored to place the subject in its setting, to develop the principles
applied by the Commission and the few courts that have rendered opinions, and to
note the major problems that have arisen. More than that has been impossible here.
If the Rule in Shelley's Case can not be kept in a nutshell, it is equally impossible
to discuss critically, within decent limits, the complex problems of distribution in
railroad reorganizations of the last decade.
Opinions will differ as to the propriety of the treatment meted out by the Com-
mission in a particular case or to a particular security. Where sacrifices are being
parceled out, enthusiasm is not likely over the results. Yet a study of the Commis-
sion's reports gives a definite impression of a sincere, painstaking, and, in most cases,
successful effort to unravel the tangled skeins and to reach a fair result. Certainly
the Commission's decisions of the last few years constitute a most important case-book
for the student of reorganization law.
85 See p. 433, suprM.
"Western Pac. R. RL Reorg, 233 L C. . 409, 414 (1939).
"It is one thing to permit preferred treatment to be given to loans made in the past, where the lender
demands such treatment as a condition to supplying new money unavailable from any other source. In the
Frisco reorganization, the Commission went much further. There, although no new money was required,
the Commission recognized "special equities" in the po.ition of the R. F. C. and the . C. C. as to loans
made in seeking to avert receivership. St. Louis-S. F. Ry. Reorg, supra note 14, at 48-59.
In contrast to this favorable treatment received by the R. F. C. is the Commission's refusal in another
case to order payment as part of the reorganization of the amount due on trustees' certificates although
such payment was in accordance with the conditions of the R. F. C.'s tentative commitment to finance
in part the cash offers of the debtor's plan. Akron, C. & Y. Ry. and Northern 0. Ry. Reorg., 228 L Q C.
645, 667-670 (1938). In the Savannah & Atlanta proceeding one of the chief problems was whether
the Piedmont Company, owner of all the common stock, over 61% of the preferred stock and about
41% of the bonds, and proponent of the only plan filed, was entitled, as proposed in the plan, to receive
all the new common in exchange for the new preferred allocable to it as a creditor and also the con-
veyance of a valuable waterfront tract. Although the Commission disagreed with the logic of this plan,
it did not dispute its fairness and- declined to interfere with the "business judgment" of the parties.
Savannah & Atlanta Ry. Reorg., 224 L C. C. 197, 213 (1937). Cf. British America Nickel Corp. Ltd. v.
M. J. O'Brien, Ltd. [1927] A. C. 369.
